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While the definition of extended conceptions of democracy has been widely discussed, the 
measurement of these constructs has not attracted similar attention. In this paper we present 
new measures of polyarchy, liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, egalitarian democracy, 
and participatory democracy that cover most polities in the period 1900 to 2013. These indices 
are based on data from a large number of indicators collected through the Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem) project. A discussion of the theoretical considerations and the concrete 
formula linked to our aggregation of indicators and components into high level measures is 
followed by an illustration of how these measures reflect variations in quality of democracy, 
given the respective ideals, in 2012. In the conclusion we urge scholars to make use of the rich 





















It is a widespread assumption in democratic theory that democracy is more than free and 
fair elections. Theorists have suggested different models of democracy that seek to expand 
electoral definitions of democracy by emphasizing liberal constitutionalism, popular participation, 
socio-economic equality, or deliberation (Held 2006; Cunningham 2002; Coppedge et al. 2011). 
However, while the definition of extended conceptions of democracy has been discussed in a 
plethora of studies, the measurement of these constructs has not attracted similar attention. In 
fact, nearly all cross-national measures of democracy attempt to capture electoral or liberal 
definitions (Coppedge et al. 2011).  
Partial exceptions do exist: The Discourse Quality Index is developed to reflect 
deliberative democracy (Steiner 2012), and the Participation Enhanced Polity Score is meant to 
capture participatory democracy (Moon et al. 2006). In addition, the democratic quality indices 
by Ringen (2007), Morlino (2011), Bühlmann et al. (2012), and the Bertelsmann Foundation 
(2014) go beyond electoral and liberal features and attempt also to measure egalitarian and/or 
participatory aspects of democracy. However, even though all of these attempts are praiseworthy, 
there is clearly room to improve the validity and reliability of measurement and to measure these 
diverse aspects of democracy in a more extensive set of countries and years. 
Against this backdrop, we present new measures of polyarchy, liberal democracy, 
deliberative democracy, egalitarian democracy, and participatory democracy that cover most 
polities in the period 1900 to 2013 (Coppedge et al. 2015a; Lindberg et al. 2014). These indices 
are based on data from a large number of indicators collected through the Varieties of 
Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2015b; see also www.V-Dem.net). In what follows we 
briefly describe the V-Dem dataset with a special emphasis on the indicators and components 
tapping into liberal, egalitarian, participatory, and deliberative aspects of political regimes. 
Thereafter, we discuss the theoretical considerations and the concrete formula linked to our 
aggregation of these aspects with polyarchy into high level measures of liberal democracy, 
egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy. Finally, we illustrate 







The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset 
 
Three features in particular characterize the uniqueness of the V-Dem data. The first is 
radical disaggregation: The abstract theoretical principles of democracy are translated into more 
than 400 detailed questions with well-defined response categories or measurement scales.1 
Second, the bulk of the data stems from almost 200 indicators collected from country experts, 
mostly academics from each country in question. The experts have been recruited based on their 
academic or other credentials as field experts in the area for which they code. (The questions are 
subdivided into 11 different areas of expertise, and most experts code only up to three areas.) 
Typically, a minimum of five independent experts respond to each question for each country and 
year going back to 1900. Thus, more than 2,600 experts from countries over the entire globe 
have helped us gather the data. While we select experts carefully, they clearly exhibit varying 
levels of reliability and bias. In addition, some periods are naturally more unknown than others, 
varying both across country-years and different sets of indicators. Therefore – and this is the 
third unique feature of V-Dem – we use Bayesian ordinal item response theory (IRT) modeling 
techniques to estimate latent country coding unit characteristics from our collection of expert 
ratings (see Pemstein et al. 2015). At present (i.e., April 2015), we have completed data collection 
for 173 countries or semi-sovereign territories.  
In this article we focus on the measurement of five key principles or traditions that offer 
distinctive approaches to defining democracy—electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and 
egalitarian. There is a thin and a thick version for each of these principles. The thin version, 
which we refer to as its “component,” includes only the most distinctive attributes of that 
principle, minimizing its overlap with the other principles. Thus, we refer to a “liberal 
component,” a “deliberative component,” and so on, which are designed to be conceptually 
distinct even though they may be empirically correlated.  
• The electoral component of democracy embodies the core value of making rulers 
responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate 
during periodic elections. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral 
component is fundamental; without it, we cannot call a regime “democratic” in 
any sense. At the same time, we recognize that holding elections alone is 
insufficient, and also that countries can have “democratic qualities” without 
being electoral democracies. 
                                                      
1 A listing of all of the components, subcomponents, and indicators included in each of the democracy indices is 
available in the online appendix to this article. For details on all the over 400 indicators supplied by V-Dem, see the 
V-Dem Codebook v4 available at https://v-dem.net. 
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• The liberal component of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting 
individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the majority.” This 
is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, 
and effective checks and balances that limit the use of executive power. 
• The participatory component embodies the values of direct rule and active 
participation by citizens in all political processes; it emphasizes non-electoral 
forms of political participation such as through civil society organizations and 
mechanisms of direct democracy. 
• The deliberative component enshrines the core value that political decisions in 
pursuit of the public good should be informed by respectful and reasonable 
dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, 
parochial interests, or coercion. 
• The egalitarian component holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit 
the actual exercise of formal rights and liberties; hence a more equal distribution 
of resources, education, and health across various groups should enhance 
political equality.  
 
Aggregating Components into High Level Indices 
We also recognize the need for “full” democracy indices that reflect the varying schools of 
thought. The first step is to focus on electoral democracy. We have opted to capture Dahl’s 
(1998) concept of polyarchy, which identifies the following political institutions as constitutive of 
modern representative democracy: 1) elected officials, 2) free, fair, and frequent elections, 3) 
freedom of expression, 4) alternative sources of information, 5) associational autonomy, and 6) 
inclusive citizenship. The V-Dem Electoral Democracy index measures these features using the 
elected executive index (v2x_accex, based on 12 indicators), the clean elections index 
(v2xel_frefair, based on 8 indicators), the freedom of expression index (v2x_freexp_thick, based 
on 9 indicators, including 3 for alternative sources of information), the freedom of association 
index (v2x_frassoc_thick, based on 6 indicators), and the suffrage indicator (v2x_suffr); all range 






Electoral Democracy (polyarchy)=  
.1*elected executive + .1*clean elections + .1*freedom of expression + .1*freedom of 
association + .1*suffrage + .5*elected executive * clean elections * freedom of expression * 
freedom of association * suffrage.  
 
In our view this aggregation rule reflects how the different parts are related to – and 
contribute to – the overarching concept. On the one hand, the five-way interaction between the 
different attributes, which receives half of the weight, causes a high score on one indicator to be 
dragged down by a low score on another. The logic is that to some extent the contribution of 
one attribute depends on the presence of the other. If, say, oppositional candidates are not 
allowed to run for election, or the elections are fraudulent, it does not matter much for the level 
of electoral democracy that all adults have voting rights. On the other hand, we think that it 
should matter something rather than nothing, which is the reason for giving some weight to the 
individual features. As a consequence, our formula is situated half way between a straight average 
and strict multiplication. It is thus a compromise between the two best known aggregation 
formulas in the literature, both allowing some “compensation” in one sub-component for lack of 
polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component.   
We then construct the “thick” versions of each of the alternative principles of democracy. 
They all include one overlapping element - namely, electoral democracy, as we believe that no regime 
should be called a “democracy” of any type unless it builds on this foundation. In order to create 
measures that reflect the varying definitions of democracy, we thus need to combine the scores 
for our Electoral Democracy (polyarchy) Index with the scores for the components measuring 
deliberation, equality, participation, and liberal constitutionalism, respectively. This is not an easy 
task. Imagine two components, P=Polyarchy and HPC=High Principle Component (liberal, 
egalitarian, participatory, or deliberative),2 that we want to aggregate into a more general high-
level index, called an HLI (Deliberative Democracy Index, Egalitarian Democracy Index, and so 
on). For convenience, both P and HPC are scaled to a continuous 0-1 interval. Based on 
extensive deliberations among the authors and other members of the V-Dem research group, we 
have tentatively arrived at the following aggregation formula:  
 
HLI = .25*P1.6 + .25*HPC + .5*P1.6*HPC 
 
                                                      
2 The HPCs are indices based on the aggregation of a large number of indicators (liberal=23, egalitarian=8, 
participatory=21, deliberative=5). 
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Without going into detail, the underlying rationale for this formula, which we apply to all 
four HLIs, is the following.  A “classical” definition, based on necessary and sufficient 
conditions, would put all the emphasis on the combination of Polyarchy and HPC, that is, the 
interaction term. According to this view, Deliberative Democracy, for example, requires 
deliberation and Polyarchy. However, we also see some legitimacy in “family resemblance” 
definitions, which allow for the HLI to be satisfied by Polyarchy or deliberation, corresponding 
to substitutability between the additive terms in the equation. In essence, by including both the 
additive and interaction terms and weighting them according to the number of components they 
reflect, we give equal weight to the classical and family resemblance definitions: half the weight 
to the additive terms and half to the multiplicative interaction. 
Second, the more the country approximates Polyarchy, the more the combined HLI score 
for a country should reflect the unique component. This perspective is an incremental version of 
theoretical arguments presented in the literature saying that polyarchy or electoral democracy 
conditions should be satisfied before the other democracy component contribute much to the 
high level index values. At the same time, it reflects the view in the literature that when a certain 
level of polyarchy is reached, what matters in terms of, say, participatory democracy is how much 
of the participatory property of democracy the country has. This argument also resembles a 
widespread perspective in the quality of democracy literature emphasizing that the fulfillment of 
some baseline democracy criteria are needed before it makes sense to assess the quality of 
democracy. (For an overview, see Munck 2015.) The question then becomes at what rate this 
influence should increase. We arrived at the power parameter of 1.6 by defining an anchor point: 
When a country is a pure hybrid regime, i.e., the polyarchy score is .5 (in practice, this is largely 
the breaking point where countries would be considered electoral democracies in a minimal 
sense), and HPC is at its maximum (=1), the high level index score should be set at .5.3   
Collectively, these thick versions of the five concepts are what we refer to as “varieties of 
democracy.” We argue that, taken together, these offer a fairly comprehensive accounting of the 
concept of democracy. 
 
  
                                                      
3 Define the power parameter as p. Setting Polyarchy=.5, HPC=1, and HLI=.5, and solving for 
HLI=.25*Polyarchy^p + .25*HPC + .5*Polyarchy^p*HPC, p=log(base 0.5) of .25/.75 ≈ 1.6. 
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Descriptive Patterns  
 
Figures 1-4 are three-dimensional scatter plots showing the relationships between each 
HLI, the Electoral Democracy Index (“Polyarchy”), and the corresponding High Principle 
Component in 2012. Selected well-known countries in all ranges of values are labeled. Each 
graph is rotated differently to enhance the visibility of the spikes for the selected countries. 
Although countries that are conventionally considered democratic, such as Britain, France, 
Switzerland, and the United States are found near the top of each figure and highly undemocratic 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and Eritrea are found near the bottom, there are 
differences. First, countries are more dispersed on the egalitarian component than on the other 
components. This makes it possible for Cuba to get a very high score on the egalitarian 
component but a low score on electoral democracy, and therefore a rather low score on 
egalitarian democracy. In the high corner of the same figure, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Switzerland score higher than the United States on egalitarian democracy, while the United States 
is near the top on liberal and deliberative democracy. Switzerland and Uruguay have the highest 
scores on participatory democracy due to their generous provisions for direct democracy 
mechanisms. On the deliberative democracy plot, China has an electoral democracy score close 
to those of North Korea and Turkmenistan, but its deliberative democracy score is noticeably 
higher because North Korea and Turkmenistan had far more autocratic leaders in 2012. Many 


















Figure 1. The relationships between Egalitarian 
Democracy Index, the Electoral Democracy Index 





Figure 3. The relationships between Liberal 
Democracy Index, the Electoral Democracy Index 





Figure 2. The relationships between Deliberative 
Democracy Index, the Electoral Democracy Index 





Figure 4. The relationships between Participatory 
Democracy Index, the Electoral Democracy Index 




Over the recent decades we have witnessed an increased interest from academics, NGOs, 
and politician in the measurement of conceptions of democracy that go beyond electoral aspects. 
However, country-specific assessments have hardly been followed by the development of large 
cross-national datasets aimed at capturing these non-electoral aspects. In this short paper, we 
have demonstrated that the V-Dem dataset provides a large number of relevant indicators, 
covering most polities of the world from 1900 and onwards. Furthermore, we have presented 
our aggregation scheme, and we have shown the resulting scores can be used to capture 
similarities and differences in democratic quality across space and time, as measured by the 
different high level indices for liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, egalitarian democracy, 
and participatory democracy, respectively.   
These graphs revealed interesting patterns. Nonetheless, for many purposes, we 
recommend scholars and practitioners alike to make use of the more nuanced disaggregated data 
made available by V-Dem. Nuances get lost when  many indicators are combined into sub-
components, components, and high level indices. Moreover, many aggregation rules are possible; 
we do not claim that the ones presented here are the best for every application, although in our 
experience most aggregation rules yield high correlated scores with these data. We are ready to 
enter open-minded discussions about these issues. Most importantly, the raw data on indicators 
and the indices, along with 95 % confidence bounds, will be available by December 31, 2015 for 
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Appendix 1: List of all of the components and subcomponents 
included in each index 
 




.1*v2x_suffr + .1*v2xel_frefair + .1*v2x_accex + .1*v2x_frassoc_thick + .1*v2x_freexp_thick + 
.5* v2x_suffr * v2xel_frefair * v2x_accex * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_freexp_thick 
Freedom of expression 
expanded v2x_freexp_thick Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model 
Government censorship 
effort - Media   v2mecenefm      
Harassment of journalists   v2meharjrn      
Media self-censorship   v2meslfcen      
Freedom of discussion for 
men   v2cldiscm      
Freedom of discussion for 
women   v2cldiscw      
Freedom of academic and 
cultural expression   v2clacfree      
Media bias   v2mebias      
Print/broadcast media 
critical   v2mecrit      
Print/broadcast media 
perspectives   v2merange      
Freedom of association 
(thick)  v2x_frassoc_thick Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model 
Party Ban   v2psparban     
Barriers to parties   v2psbars     
Opposition parties 
autonomy   v2psoppaut     
Elections multiparty   v2elmulpar     
CSO entry and exit   v2cseeorgs     
CSO repression   v2csreprss     
Share of adult population 
with suffrage  v2x_suffr 
  
  
Percent of adult population 
with suffrage    v2elsuffrage     
Clean elections v2xel_frefair 
Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model. Since the bulk of these 
indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then 
been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg) 
EMB autonomy   v2elembaut     
EMB capacity   v2elembcap     
Election voter registry   v2elrgstry     
Election vote buying   v2elvotbuy     
Election other voting 
irregularities   v2elirreg     
Election government 
intimidation   v2elintim     
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Election other electoral 
violence   v2elpeace     
Election free and fair   v2elfrfair     
Elected executive (de 
jure)  v2x_accex 
Six different chains of appointment/selection are taken into account. First, 
whether the head of state is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). Second, the 
extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b), measured as the 
proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted 
average of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight defined by 
which house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral). Third, whether the 
head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature 
is necessary for the appointment of the head of state (c1=1, otherwise 0).  
Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or 
the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head 
of government (c2=1, otherwise 0). Fifth, whether the head of government 
is appointed by the head of state (d=1) or not (d=0). Sixth, whether the head 
of government is directly elected (e=1) or not (e=0). Define hosw as the 
weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government 
(v2exhoshog==1), hosw=1. If the head of state has more power than the 
head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet 
ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal 
power, hosw=.5. Define the weight for the head of government as hogw=1-
hosw.  
hosw*[max(a1, b*c1)]+hogw*[max(a1*d, b*c1*d, a2, b*c2)] 
Lower chamber elected   v2lgello     
Upper chamber elected   v2lgelecup     
Legislature dominant 
chamber   v2lgdomchm     
HOS selection by legislature 
in practice   v2exaphos     
HOS appointment in 
practice   v2expathhs     
HOG selection by 
legislature in practice   v2exaphogp     
HOG appointment in 
practice   v2expathhg     
HOS appoints cabinet in 
practice   v2exdfcbhs     
HOG appoints cabinet in 
practice   v2exdjcbhg     
HOS dismisses ministers in 
practice   v2exdfdmhs     
HOG dismisses ministers in 
practice   v2exdfdshg     
HOS appoints cabinet in 
practice   v2exdfcbhs      
            
Liberal Democracy Index 
(v2x_libdem) 
  
  .25* v2x_polyarchy^1.6 + .25* v2x_liberal + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.6* v2x_liberal 
Electoral Democracy 
Index  v2x_polyarchy 
 
      
Liberal Component Index v2x_liberal 
 
 Average 
Equality before the law 
and individual liberty    v2xcl_rol  Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model 
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Rigorous and impartial 
public administration      v2clrspct     
Transparent laws with 
predictable enforcement      v2cltrnslw    
Access to justice for men      v2clacjstm    
Access to justice for women      v2clacjstw    
Property rights for men      v2clprptym    
Property rights for women     v2clprptyw    
Freedom from torture      v2cltort     
Freedom from political 
killings      v2clkill    
Freedom from forced labor 
for men      v2clslavem    
Freedom from forced labor 
for women      v2clslavef    
Freedom of religion      v2clrelig    
Freedom of foreign 
movement      v2clfmove    
Freedom of domestic 
movement for men      v2cldmovem    
Freedom of domestic 
movement for women      v2cldmovew    
Judicial constraints on the 
executive    v2x_jucon Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model 
Executive respects 
constitution      v2exrescon    
Compliance with judiciary      v2jucomp    
Compliance with high court      v2juhccomp    
High court independence      v2juhcind    
Lowercourtindependence      v2juncind    
Legislative constraints on 
the executive    v2xlg_legcon Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model 
Legislature questions 
officials in practice      v2lgqstexp    
Executive oversight      v2lgotovst    
Legislature investigates in 
practice      v2lginvstp    
Legislature opposition 
parties      v2lgoppart    
            
Deliberative Democracy 
Index 
(v2x_delibdem)  .25* v2x_polyarchy^1.6 + .25* v2x_ delib + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.6* v2x_ delib 
Electoral Democracy 
Index  v2x_polyarchy 
 
      
Deliberative Component 
Index  v2xdl_delib 
 Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model 
  
Reasoned justification   v2dlreason      
Common good   v2dlcommon      
Respect counterarguments   v2dlcountr      
 6 
Range of consultation   v2dlconslt      
Engaged society   v2dlengage      
            
Egalitarian democracy Index 
(v2x_egaldem)  .25* v2x_polyarchy^1.6 + .25* v2x_ egal + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.6* v2x_ egal 
Electoral Democracy 
Index  v2x_polyarchy 
 
      
Egalitarian Component 
Index v2x_egal  Point estimates from Bayesian factor analysis model 
Power distributed by 
socioeconomic position   v2pepwrses       
Power distributed by social 
group   v2pepwrsoc       
Social group equality in 
respect for civil liberties   v2clsocgrp       
Educational equality   v2peedueq       
Health equality   v2pehealth       
Power distributed by gender   v2pepwrgen       
Encompassing-ness   v2dlencmps       
Means-tested vs. 
universalistic   v2dlunivl      





 .25* v2x_polyarchy^1.6 + .25* v2x_ partip + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.6* v2x_ partip 
  
Electoral Democracy 
Index  v2x_polyarchy 
 
      
Participatory Component 
Index v2x_partip Average  
Civil society participation   v2x_cspart    
Candidate selection--
National/local     v2pscnslnl     
CSO consultation     v2cscnsult      
CSO participatory 
environment     v2csprtcpt    
CSO womens participation     v2csgender    
Direct Popular Vote 
Index    v2xdd_dd    
Initiatives permitted     v2ddlegci     
Initiatives signatures %   v2ddsigcip   
Initiatives signature-
gathering time limit   v2ddgrtlci   
Initiatives signature-
gathering period   v2ddgrgpci   
Initiatives level   v2ddlevci   
Initiatives participation 
threshold   v2ddbindci   
Initiatives approval 
threshold   v2ddthreci   
Initiatives super majority   v2ddspmjci   
Initiatives administrative 
threshold   v2dddistci   
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Initiatives permitted   v2ddlegci   
Occurrence of citizen-
initiative this year   v2ddciniyr   
Local Government   v2xel_locelec 
First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so 
that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only 
assembly elected or both assembly and executive 
elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 
0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power 
(v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.  
Local government elected     v2ellocelc    
Local offices relative power     v2ellocpwr    
Local government exists     v2ellocgov   
Regional Government   v2xel_regelec 
First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded 
so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 
2=only assembly elected or both assembly and executive 
elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 
0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power 
(v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. 
Regional government 
elected     v2elsrgel    
Regional offices relative 
power     v2elrgpwr    
Regional government exists     v2elreggov   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
